in today’s Times, Thomas B. Edsall has another of his wise analyses of the challenge Trump poses to liberals . It shows that just throwing darts at Trump’s illiberal statements and actions will not be enough of a response.
In the early days of the 2016 campaign, many pundits seemed certain that Donald Trump couldn’t win the Republican nomination, because he was not a real conservative. The Republican base, conventional wisdom had it, would demand a hard-core ideologue—someone who was, in Mitt Romney’s tortured phrasing, “severely conservative.” Conservative intellectuals observed darkly that the real estate developer was, in fact, a former Democrat, lacking both principles and a true conservative ideology. But Republican voters either didn’t notice or didn’t care—or, most likely, both.
Trump instinctively understood this. Instead of studying up to pass conservative litmus tests, Trump talked about “winning” and “losing.” He was a fighter, not an ideologue. If you voted for Trump, you were picking a winner. And weren’t you tired of losing?
Pundits and writers didn’t grasp the appeal, because for them, politics was and is first and foremost about principles. But they live in a rarified high-information world of fellow travelers who have also devoted their lives to said principles. For most voters, principles are a lot more flexible. And a fair amount of research suggests that, for them, politics is a team sport, and they mostly just want to be on the winning side.
Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public, a new book by political scientists Donald Kinder and Nathan Kalmoe, makes a clear and compelling case that most voters neither fully understand nor particularly care about ideology. The book didn’t come out until late May, nearly six months after the election was decided. But its antecedents go way back. In fact, Kinder and Kalmoe bill their book as an update of a classic 1964 essay by the renowned political scientist Philip Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.”
Converse documented that five in six Americans lacked a meaningful understanding of what it even meant to be a liberal or a conservative. For them, politics was a clash not of ideologies but of interests and group loyalties. They chose their leaders by figuring out who was on their side.
About one in six voters—roughly 17 percent—did, however, think in ideological terms. Interestingly, this number hasn’t changed in fifty years. These voters are still consistent in their opinions from year to year, and pay close attention to politics. They consume lots of news, and tend to be well educated. If you’re reading this article in this magazine, chances are that you are one of them.
But for most people, politics is still about groups and identities. As Kinder and Kalmoe write, “public opinion arises primarily from the attachments and antipathies of group life.” We can’t escape from a basic fact: there is a “deep human predisposition to divide the social world into in-groups and out-groups.”
Roughly half of Americans decline to call themselves a “liberal” or a “conservative.” From 1972 to 2012, slightly more than a quarter (27.5 percent, on average) declined to pick a category at all, and roughly a quarter (24.5 percent, on average) chose to call themselves a “moderate.” But as Kinder and Kalmoe write, “the moderate category seems less an ideological destination than a refuge for the innocent and the confused.”
When asked whether they are “liberal,” “moderate,” or “conservative,” many people may choose to call themselves “moderate” because it feels like the judicious choice. Beltway pundits often get confused by this self-identification, because in Washington “moderate” usually means “centrist.” For most people, however, “moderate” just implies sensible and not extremist.
But “moderates” do not form a meaningful voting bloc. They are all over the map on self-reported issue positions, and generally tend to be less informed about politics. And because they have no coherent ideology, no single coherent political program appeals to them.
Even many who identify as “liberal” or “conservative” may simply be expressing a kind of group attachment rather than reflecting a well-worked-out and stable political worldview. Repeated surveys show, as Kinder and Kalmoe also note, that “ideological identification is connected to membership in social groupings. . . . Blacks are liberal; whites are conservatives. Jews and secularists lean to the left; Protestants to the right.”
Perhaps the biggest surprise of the book is the remarkable stability of data: Converse’s 1964 paper was based on survey data from 1956 and 1960, a time when American politics was far less polarized, and a time in which sociologist Daniel Bell could plausibly write a book called The End of Ideology. Americans in general were not nearly as well educated, and access to political news was far more limited. Yet the ideological innocents still outnumbered ideological thinkers by about five to one.
What about the rapid increase in polarization between 1972 and 2012? Yes, “the ideological center has shrunk,” say Kinder and Kalmoe. But that change has been remarkably slow. As the authors write, “Americans, one could say, are inching their way toward an ideologically divided society.”
The big change is that America has become more partisan. And this is a key point: ideology and partisanship are different things. Ideology is an intellectual framework, a “form of cognition” that “supplies citizens with a stable foundation for understanding and action.” Partisanship is a form of teamsmanship, an almost fervid attachment to one’s own side. Ideology requires a detailed policy understanding to make sense of politics. With partisanship, all you need to know is whether you are a Democrat or a Republican.
And after all, this is how political life is organized. People don’t support the liberal or the conservative party. They support Democrats or Republicans. As Kinder and Kalmoe note, “citizens are regularly offered the opportunity to act on their partisanship: to vote, argue, work on a campaign, give money, register, show up at a rally, and more. Such behavioral commitments reinforce and strengthen partisanship.” By contrast, “[t]here is nothing like this for ideology. . . . Parties are material realities in a way that ideologies are not.”
Democrats generally espouse “liberal” policy positions, while Republicans generally take “conservative” ones. Loyal followers of both parties make these positions their own. As a result, what passes for “conservative” or “liberal” is mostly just what party leaders say it is. And when what they say is inconsistent, most voters follow without worrying about the inherent contradictions. Witness, for example, how much Donald Trump has managed to change Republican public opinion on trade policy and Russia, while still calling his position “conservative”—much to the chagrin of the true conservative intellectuals, who have a well-reasoned set of principles to guide their thinking.
Ideology requires a detailed policy understanding to make sense of politics. With partisanship, all you need to know is whether you are a Democrat or a Republican.Neither Liberal nor Conservative is a slender volume, and a fast and clear read. It’s also a standard political science book, with the comprehensive theory that most Americans don’t think about politics in ideological terms, even if pundits do. But this targeted focus comes with limitations. For one, the very important point that group loyalties structure politics more than ideology gets tossed off as an aside at the end, with instructions to read Kinder’s earlier works on the subject.
For another, even if the public is mostly nonideological, ideology still has a crucial role to play in politics. The activists and policymakers and intellectuals who shape public policy are high-information ideological thinkers, and the ideologues who organize their thinking have profound influence on politics, since they set the agenda. (The book to read on this topic is Hans Noel’s excellent Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America.)
Kinder and Kalmoe also ignore the possibility that there might be other coherent ideologies besides the plain-vanilla “liberal” and “conservative,” but this omission reflects a larger problem with how political scientists have conducted surveys and thought about ideology for decades.
Still, Neither Liberal nor Conservative stands as an important corrective to the prevailing narrative that American voters are becoming more ideological. They are not. They are becoming more partisan. An optimistic takeaway is that politicians and parties have more flexibility than we might think they do. If ideology is somewhat rigid and prescriptive, partisanship is opportunistic, and perhaps even pragmatic. President Trump may yet pivot to the political middle, and if he does, many Republicans will come along for the ride if that’s what it now means to be a Republican. But if Trump is like most Americans in not being an ideologue, he is also like most Americans in seeing politics as a zero-sum battle between “us” and “them,” between “winners” and “losers.” In the end, this may turn out to be even more dangerous than ideology. Principles at least provide some limits and emphasize reason. But group-based conflict, being based primarily on emotion, lacks those same constraints.
Many Democrats, dazzled by the incompetence of the Republicans in Washington, have concluded that a Democratic wave is certain in the future, beginning with a return to a Democratic House in 2018.
They forget the farce of 2016 when those inept Republicans swept into full power in Washington, led by the worst presidential candidate since Buchanan. According to Tom Edsall, in today’s NY Times, the Democratic Party is in worse shape than you thought, and he proceeds to demonstrate that point by analysis of the voting last year, especially the voters who switched from Obama to Trump.
What the autopsy reveals is that Democratic losses among working class voters were not limited to whites; that crucial constituencies within the party see its leaders as alien; and that unity over economic populism may not be able to turn back the conservative tide.
Equally disturbing, winning back former party loyalists who switched to Trump will be tough: these white voters’ views on immigration and race are in direct conflict with fundamental Democratic tenets.
Some of these post-mortem conclusions are based on polling and focus groups conducted by the Democratic super PAC Priorities USA; others are drawn from a collection of 13 essays published by The American Prospect.
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For all the harm he has done, continues to do and proposes to do, Trump has successfully forced Democrats to begin to examine the party’s neglected liabilities, the widespread resentment of its elites and the frail loyalty of its supporters.
Read “Listen Liberal: or Whatever Hppened to the Party of the People?” by Thomas Frank. if you want to find out how we got there.
Jared Bernstein is an economist and senior fellow at the Center on Budget Policy Priorities. Today in the NY Times he has an op-ed taking an optimistic view that the Democratic Pparty is shifting to a more progressive policy. I’m not sure that I’m convinced and suspect that the party is still too fond of Clinton’s “triangulating”. Still, it cheers me up and I hope Bernstein’s right.
Thomas B Edsall, in the NY Times today, describes a critical new factor in American political life – the conflict between progressive ideas and the growing wealth of important Democratic party factions. Here’s the beginning of the article:
During his primary campaign against Hillary Clinton, Senator Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed socialist, lived up to the grand Democratic tradition of favoring the underdog at the expense of the rich.
He proposed hammering the affluent by raising taxes in the amount of $15.3 trillion over ten years. New revenues would finance about half the cost of a $33.3 trillion boost in social spending
The Sanders tax-and-spending plan throws into sharp relief the problem that the changing demographic makeup of the Democratic coalition creates for party leaders. Trouble brews when a deeply held commitment to the underdog comes into conflict with the self-interested pocketbook and lifestyle concerns of the upper middle class.
The nonpartisan Tax Policy Center found that under the Sanders plan, a married couple filing jointly with an income below $10,650 would continue to pay no income tax; everyone else would pay higher taxes. Those in the second quintile would pay an additional $1,625 and those in the middle quintile would see their income tax liability increase by $4,692. Those in the top quintile would pay $42,719 more.
Higher up the ladder, the tax increase would grow to $130,275 for those in the top 5 percent, to $525,365 for those in the top one percent and to $3.1 million for the top 0.1 percent.
When the additional revenues from the Sanders tax hike are subtracted from the additional spending his proposals would demand, the net result is an $18.1 trillion increase in the national debt over 10 years, according to the center.
In rhetoric reminiscent of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman, Sanders declared:
We must send a message to the billionaire class: “you can’t have it all.” You can’t get huge tax breaks while children in this country go hungry.
But Sanders spoke to the Democratic Party of 2016, not the Democratic Party of the Great Depression.
In days past, a proposal to slam the rich to reward the working and middle classes meant hitting Republicans to benefit Democrats.
Even as recently as 1976, according to data from American National Election Studies, the most affluent voters, the top 5 percent, were solidly in the Republican camp, 77-23. Those in the bottom third of the income distribution were solidly Democratic, 64-36.
In other words, 41 years ago, the year Jimmy Carter won the presidency, the Sanders proposal would have made political sense.
But what about now?
The response of Democratic Party elites to Sanders’ proposals should answer that question. Read the rest of his article here.
In his May 23 blog entry Paul Krugman comments on the woes of truckers, at one time well paid middle level workers in America. Average incomes (adjusted for inflation) for truckers have fallen from about $32 an hour in 1975 to $21/hour in 1995 and have been stagnant since, (That’s less than $40,00/year.)
Krugman notes that many of the usual explanatioins for reduced worker pay, such as increased automation, do not apply here. He argues that the decline of unionization since the time of Reagan is the reason.
I’ve noted that denunciation of unions is the most common mantra of so-called conservatives, along with praise of low taxes for the rich. What bothers me is that unions seem to be losing favor with traditional Democratic supporters under the barrage of conservative propaganda. I didn’t see NJ Dems coming to the aid of the teacher unions underincessant criticism by Gov. Christie. And then we had the sorry spectacle of Democratic leaders sucking up to Christie in his re-election campaign. It makes me question the window label on the back of my car – “Proud Democrat.”
In an article in the current American Conservative – “What Obsessing About You-Know-Who Causes Us To Miss” – Andrew Bacevich notes that “responsible jounalism’s” preoccupatioin with correcting Trump’s lies and distortions has resulted in an obsession on that topic and a lack of coverage of issues of greater importance. And so he proceeds to note and discuss 24 significant national security issues that he feels get little press attention. It’s worth reading, and thinking about.
Here’s my version of one of them. Trump has announced that our military needs an increase in its annual budget of $54 Billion. (I note that this will include $111M each for 74 F-35 fighters, a new pentagon boondoggle that is not yet able to meet operational requirements.) I have seen no discussion of the need for this increase in the press, with the Democrats acting like the usual sheep they are on military budgets. Residents of New Jersey’s 11th congressional district will note that Rodney Frelinghuysen, while voting for the new Trumpcare monstrosity, for which he was condemned by the press, also used his influence to increase the current budget allocation to our Picatinny Arsenal. For this he was praised by the press, thus demonstrating why our military spending is never questioned.
Moreover, the last time (START-1) the Senate approve a treaty with the Russians to limit nuclear weapons, the Republicans in Congress held out for the ongoing trillion dollar modernization of our nuclear forces. The need for this has never been demonstrated, but the cost is comparable to the infrastructure rebuilding needs in the US. This, too, is always taken as a given and never discussed.
Thomas B Edsall had a fascinating article in the NY Times on Aprli 13 about those areas where Trump support is strongest. It’s another world.
The devastating recession that began at the end of 2007 and officially ended in June 2009 was the most severe downturn since World War II.
The political, social and even medical consequences of this recession have been duly noted, but even so the depths of its effects are only now becoming clear. One we’re still learning more about is how the rural, less populated regions of the country (known among demographers as nonmetropolitan counties), which already suffered from higher than average poverty rates, recovered from the recession at a far slower pace than more populous metropolitan counties.
The fact that people living outside big cities were battered so acutely by the recession goes a long way toward explaining President Trump’s victory in the last election.
In Luzerne County, in northeast Pennsylvania, population 316,383 and falling, the unemployment rate in February 2017 was 6.7 percent, substantially higher than it had been at the start of the recession (it was at 4.6 percent in October 2007). The total number of people in the county labor force declined by 2,544.
In 2016, Luzerne County, which had twice previously cast majorities for Obama, supported Trump 57.9 to 38.6 percent.
This is a national phenomenon. Although the unemployment level has recovered in the metropolitan counties to 4.8% above that before the recession, the level in nonmetropolitan counties is still 2.4 % below the pre-recession level.
And it is a new phenomenon,
Put still another way, counties with populations below one million have seen their share of job creation drop from 84 percent of the national total in 1992-96 to 78 percent in 2002-06 — and then abruptly plummet to 59 percent in 2010-14.
Edsall also discusses the more familiar increase in morbidty data, specifically a
. . . . description of rising midlife mortality — especially an increase of “deaths of despair” from alcohol, opioids and suicide — is, in effect, a demographic portrait of many of Trump’s core supporters: whites with a high school degree or less living in rural to medium-sized towns and cities.
Here’s a point of view suggested by this data.
Bill Bishop, co-author of the book “The Big Sort” and a founder of The Daily Yonder, makes the case that the political split in America is not an urban-rural divide. Instead, he argues, it is between the largest cities and the rest of America.
In an email, Bishop noted that
outside of cities of a million or more — and really outside of the 56 central city counties of these large metros — Democrats lose.
This applies not only to presidential races, but to the House as well. In a piece for The Daily Yonder, Bishop wrote that “Democrats don’t have a ‘rural problem.’ They have an ‘everywhere-but-big-cities problem’.” He provided data on the pattern of partisan victory in 2014 House races on a scale from super urban to very rural. Democrats won a majority of districts only in the most urban counties, while Republicans won two out of every three in very rural districts.
Bishop argued in his email to me that “the split isn’t just about politics. It’s about lifestyle and identity.” Increasingly, where you live
is tied into lifestyle and lifestyle aligns with politics. Politics, like lifestyle, is one way we construct our identities.
The accelerated shift toward urban prosperity and exurban-to-rural stagnation reinforces polarizing disagreements between city and country on matters ranging from family values to education to child rearing practices to religious faith.
It all makes the argumentx about why Hillary didn’t do better seem trivial.
PS There are two maps in the article showing counties, colored by election winners, for the 1992 and 2016 elections. They’re shocking. No wonder Trump thinks he won in a landslide.
It seems that Trump has indeed lifted the restraints on the military that Bush 2 and Obama had maintained. In the same week we have witnessed: (1) an attack on a Syrian airfield by 59 (59 Tomahawk missiles, with the result the destruction of 20 Syrian aircraft, and (2) The dropping of the 11 ton MOAB on a cave and tunnel complex in Afghanistan which resulted, we are told, in the death of 36 ISIS fighters.
The week’s activities could not do better to illustrate the futility of our high tech military in the kind of asymmetric warfare that faces the US today. It was like a real-life SNL sketch.
It’s pretty obvious that the generals, restraints removed, took the opportunity to demonstrate their new toy, the MOAB. I don’t think that’s the wrong word to use in describing it. Remember the look of the conventional “iron” bombs of earlier wars and then compare to the polished, gleaming orange surface of the MOAB. The thing had been prettied up! I’m surprised it wasn’t decorated with tinsel.
PS: 4/20 Today’s NY Times has an article by someone who tried to go to the site.
Tom Engelhardt writes a blog (Tomdispatch.com) that is a higher-powered version of mine, in that it calls attention to other writings that may have general interest. This week he uses it to distribute an article by Andrew Bacevich on the subject of amerca’s putative exceptionalism.
Both of them take a little time getting to the point but I think it’s worth the effort. The allusions to The Church of America the Redeemer are worth it alone.